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INTRODUCTION 
 
How do the comparative firm-specific portfolios of partners influence alliance strategies? 
To approach such an inquiry, we position the dichotomous choice of governance mode as our 
research focus, because such a strategic decision is one of the most critical consensuses between 
partners when forming an alliance. To highlight the governance effects of comparative 
firm-specific portfolios, we hypothesized a governance model by applying the literature of 
competitive dynamics (Chen, 1996) and resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991) in the 
context of alliances partners competing in the same technology-intensive industry. To specify the 
conditions when industry leaders prefer the equity-based mode or the contractual mode for their 
alliances, we developed two competing hypotheses of resources similarity versus resource 
complementarity as the governance driver of equity-based mode, and tested on a sample of 4,832 
alliances formed by 25 Semiconductor leaders during 1985 and 2010, while only 474 or 10% 
alliances formed by multiple leaders. This sample of asymmetric alliances was intentionally 
selected to illustrate the competitive dynamics driven by power asymmetry and learning 
dynamics driven by knowledge asymmetry. 
The economics literature has used information asymmetry to describe the decisions in 
transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. Applying the KBV 
(Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender, 1996) in the alliance context, our prior research 
has developed and defined the construct of knowledge asymmetry as a setting of 
inter-organizational learning where only the teaching partner owns the focal knowledge, which 
may be partner-specific or alliance-specific knowledge; while the learning partner does not (Wen 
& Chuang, 2010b). Our another research has extended the notion of asymmetry to the location 
dimension, and proposed location asymmetry as an internationally inter-organizational setting, 
where a partner owns more location-specific advantages than its partners from other countries do 
(Wen & Chuang, 2010a). Based on the previous supported findings of knowledge and location 
asymmetry as a governance determinant, this research further extended to the dimension of 
market power. Accordingly, the construct of power asymmetry is defined as a setting of 
inter-organizational learning where only some partners owns the focal market power (specified 
as a industry leader); while the other partner (as a non-leader) does not. Therefore, an alliance is 
attributed as asymmetric because of one or multiple dimensions of knowledge, location, and 
power. As a result, our research framework incorporates the notion of asymmetry in three ways: 
to sample the power-asymmetric alliances because of at least an industry leader as partner, to 
divide the sample into international versus domestic alliances based on location asymmetry; and 
to test the governance effects of asymmetry versus symmetry from four dimensions of power, 
knowledge, culture, and experience. 
In addition to multidimensional asymmetry, this research also measures the model 
variables at multiple levels as responding to the argument that strategic alliances are multilevel 
phenomena, typically involving complex interactions between alliance, firm, and industry level 
  2 
factors (Nielsen, 2010). Because our hypothesis model specifies the choice of governance mode, 
either contractual or equity-based, as the dependent variable, the analysis level of our empirical 
tests has to be at the alliance level. In addition to alliance-specific attributes as control, dyadic 
attributes between partners, and triadic attributes among partners and their alliance developed in 
our prior studies, this research adds a new analysis level of corporate portfolio to synthesize the 
firm-attributes of alliance partners under a corporate tree. Such multilevel analysis on alliances is 
expected to contribute to relevant literature when capturing the dynamics between a focal dyad 
and its strategic target, such as a partner dyad and its formed alliance. Our test results 
demonstrated that triadic and corporate attributes affect the choice of governance mode more 
significantly than dyadic and non-corporate measures. Such findings attest to our research 
contribution to specify applicable conditions of alliance strategies by incorporating multiple level 
measures and more importantly firm-specific portfolios. 
In addition to multiple level of analysis, this research also incorporates the attributes of 
alliance portfolio of each industry leader as governance determinants, under the assertion that to 
determine how firm-specific portfolios influence alliance strategies generate more managerial 
implications than to describe what the attributes of a portfolio are. Using our empirical context of 
semiconductor alliances as an example, a pair of partnering competitors with the same dyadic 
attributes may choose different governance modes when factoring in various triadic attributes, 
such as knowledge asymmetry based on which partner owning the alliance-specific knowledge, 
and cultural distance based on different alliance locations. Especially, we constructed this sample 
by aggregate the alliances portfolio of each leader, to ensure the sample uniqueness of 
power-asymmetry embedded alliances and the measure accuracy of corporate level attributes.  
In addition to analyzing the alliance portfolios by multidimensional and multi-level 
determinants, this research also investigated the learning dynamics in the asymmetric alliances.  
Based on which partner, the leader or non-leader, owns the alliance-specific knowledge domain, 
we further divided the alliance sample into the four mutually exclusive subsamples attributed as 
leader-learning, leader-teaching, co-exploiting, and co-exploring. In addition to the international 
versus the domestic subsample, we also tested these four learning subsamples and compared the 
governance effects. Our findings, that none of ten determinants sustain their governance effects 
in all subsamples, imply that different learning orientations between alliance partners affect the 
choice of governance mode of industry leaders. 
 
HYPOTHESIZED GOVERNANCE MODEL 
 
Attempting to narrow the aforementioned literature gaps from theoretical and empirical 
aspects, we developed our hypothesized governance model consisting of 5 pairs of symmetry 
versus asymmetry determinants, as shown in FIGURE 1. Apply the literature of competitive 
dynamics and organizational learning in the empirical settings of alliances, we posit two 
competing hypotheses on the propensity of equity-based mode to be driven by resource 
similarity versus resource complementarity. Accordingly, our research framework and 
empirical results may help managers to cope with the strategic dilemma: to ally with a partner 
with resource similarity or another with resource complementarity.  
——————————— 
Insert FIGURE 1 about here 
——————————— 
Following the competitive dynamic literature, resource similarity, indicated by the 
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symmetric portfolios between alliance partners, increases competitive tension in an alliance. 
Therefore, to deter partners from competitive action against one another, particularly when 
competing in the same technology intensive industry, alliance partners with similar 
firm-specific assets are hypothesized to prefer the equity-based mode (joint venture) as a 
safeguarding mechanism against potential opportunistic behaviors. Alternatively, potential 
competitors with asymmetric portfolios tend to choose the less costly contractual mode, when 
their specific assets are so different that neither cooperative exploitation nor co-exploration 
increases competitive tension between alliance partners. Therefore, equity investment is not 
necessary for alliance partners with different or complementary firm-specific portfolios to 
demand for as a mutual hostage to protect their asset specificity. 
Hypothesis A. Resource similarity, indicated by symmetric portfolios 
between alliance partners, increases the propensity of equity-based mode. 
Following the organizational learning literature, resource complementarity, indicated by 
asymmetric portfolios between alliance partners, increases inter-organizational coordination 
costs and/or learning barriers. By contrast, partners with resource complementary are also 
expected to increases their cooperative benefits when exploiting their mutually exclusive 
firm-specific assets and collectively exhaustive explorative risks. Therefore, potential 
competitors with asymmetric portfolios tend to invest equity in their alliance as a mutual 
hostage to ensure the long-term resource commitment from their partners to invest in 
cooperative mechanisms for reducing coordination costs and/or learning barriers. Alternatively, 
the partners with symmetric portfolios are hypothesized to prefer the less costly contractual 
mode, when their inter-organizational coordination and learning costs are sufficiently low, that 
equity-control is not necessary for further reducing cooperative barriers. 
Hypothesis B. Resource complementarity, indicated by asymmetric portfolios between alliance 
partners, increases the propensity of equity-based mode. 
To test such competing hypotheses, our model specifies the governance determinants 
from four dimensions of power, knowledge, culture, and experience. In each dimension, we 
further specified a pairs of determinants, representing the symmetric portfolios between 
alliance partners at the dyadic level and asymmetric portfolios at the triadic level. Accordingly, 
five symmetry determinants of firm power symmetry, firm knowledge symmetry, alliance 
knowledge symmetry, firm culture symmetry, and firm experience symmetry in each dimension 
are specified mainly at the analysis-level of the partner dyad to represent resource similarity 
between partner-specific attributes in an alliance. By contrast, the other five asymmetry 
determinants of alliance size, partner knowledge asymmetry, alliance knowledge asymmetry, 
alliance cultural distance, and partner new experience are specified at the triadic analysis-level 
between two sides of partners and their formed alliances to represent resource 
complementarity.  
We developed the governance model based on our assertion whether determinant driven 
by resource similarity or resource complementarity makes a strategic difference in choosing the 
governance mode for an alliance. Because the equity-based as the dependent variable and the 
contractual modes are alternatively coded, the significant test results will support one of the 
two governance drivers in our competing hypotheses: either resource similarity or resource 
complementarity. As illustrated in Figure 1, a positive sign of our specified determinant 
supports the hypothesized equity-based mode, and a negative sign shows that the contractual 
mode is preferred. Using the first determinant, firm power symmetry as an example, a positive 
coefficient provides the empirical evidence of Hypothesis A, that resource similarity influences 
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the alliance partners to choose the equity-based mode; by contrast, a negative sign supports 
Hypothesis B, that resource complementarity affects the partners to prefer the contractual mode. 
The reasons why our model incorporates these multilevel determinants in each dimension and 
the measures will be discussed in the section of research methods. 
Our hypothesized governance model incorporates three types of nine control variables 
mainly at the alliance-specific level: governance-trend, alliance-function, and alliance- location. 
Our prior studies (Wen & Chuang, 2010b) found a trendy effect toward the contractual mode over 
time and location effect toward the equity-based mode for the alliances located in emerging 
economies. The prior literature on TCE and alliances (Lavie & Rosenkoph, 2006), has 
demonstrated the governance effect of alliance function, which serves as a proxy of the key 
attribute to influence governance costs, asset specificity. Moreover, because this sample was 
consolidated by the firm-specific alliance portfolios of industry leaders, our model also 
incorporates a firm-specific trend factor of path dependency, indicating the preferred governance 
choice of industry leaders.  
In general, we postulate that the equity-based mode or joint venture is selected as a 
safeguarding mechanism for alliance partners driven by either resource similarity or resource 
complementarity indicating by their comparative firm-specific portfolios.  Contrastingly, the 
contractual mode is selected as a less costly learning mechanism, when either governance 
driver is not strong enough to demand for the equity commitment from potential competitive or 
learning partners. Accordingly, we hypothesize a governance model of the equity-based mode, 
consisting of five pares of symmetry and asymmetry determinants to compare their governance 
effects cross four dimensions of power, knowledge, culture, and experience, and three analysis 
levels of firm-dyads and alliance-firm-triads as independent variables, and alliance-specific 
attribute as control.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The empirical tests on the 4,832 sample alliances support the direct or contingent 
governance effects of ten multidimensional determinants. By comparison, our findings 
demonstrate that resource complementarity is the stronger governance driver than resource 
similarity, as well as the governance effects of power and knowledge dimensions stronger than 
culture and experience dimensions.  
The results of the main model show that the eight determinants have a significantly direct 
governance effect, except firm culture symmetry and partner new experience. However, only 
partner knowledge asymmetry and alliance culture distance supported Hypothesis A, that 
resource similarity increases the propensity of equity-based mode, particularly for the partners 
competing in the same technology-intensive industry. The other six determinants provided the 
empirical evidence of the competing Hypothesis B, that resource complementarity increases 
the propensity of equity-based mode. In addition, our findings show consistent governance 
effects of resource similarity toward the contractual mode, but contrasting effects of resource 
complementarity. The larger alliance size and alliance knowledge asymmetry increase the 
propensity of equity-based mode, whereas, by contrast, the longer alliance cultural distance 
and alliance knowledge asymmetry increase the contractual propensity. 
In general, our contingent view of governance determinants are empirically supported by 
our findings, five determinants show contrasting significance between international and domestic 
alliances. Three determinants of firm power symmetry, alliance knowledge symmetry, and 
alliance cultural distance, increases the contractual propensity; however, fail to sustain such 
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effect for domestic alliances. By contrast, two determinants of partner knowledge asymmetry and 
firm culture symmetry affect the choice of governance mode for domestic alliances, but become 
insignificant for international alliances.  
The most contrasting determinant is alliance cultural distance (RCD), which increases the 
contractual propensity for international alliances, but also increases the propensity of 
equity-based mode for domestic alliances. Such contrasting results may be partially explained by 
the extreme coding principle of RCD, which calculates the cultural distance of the same country 
or domestic location as 0. Applying the real options perspective (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; 
Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001; Trigeorgis, 1996) in the context of international alliances, the 
industry leaders may use the less costly contractual mode as a real option to manage the 
uncertainty of foreign direct investment. Moreover, as a weak determinant in the main model, 
firm culture symmetry indicating the partners positioned in the same level of headquarters or 
subsidiary influences the partners to choose the equity-based mode for domestic and 
leader-teaching alliances. 
In general, our contingent view of governance determinants are empirically supported by 
our findings that none of ten significant determinants sustains their direct governance effect 
across all of four learning subsamples, as well as two insignificant determinants of firm culture 
symmetry and partner new experience still demonstrate their governance effect in one applicable 
condition. The results do not show any coefficient of alliance knowledge asymmetry because the 
sample is split based on this portfolio attribute, which is invariant in each subsample. Among the 
other nine determinants, firm power symmetry is the only one fails to demonstrate any 
governance effect in four subsamples. Such an exception implies that knowledge portfolios 
influences learning dynamics between alliance partners more significant than comparative 
market power. The strongest determinant is alliance size, which maintains its governance effect 
of the equity-based mode for the other three subsamples than leader-learning alliances. 
Comparing the test results among four subsamples, no significant determinant is found for 
the leader-learning subsample consisting of the least alliances (8%). Such an exception implies 
that there is no dominating alliance strategy when industry leaders need to learn the 
alliance-specific knowledge from non-leaders. By contrast, six determinants demonstrate their 
effect for leader-teaching alliances (44%). Particularly, the change that firm culture symmetry 
turns significant toward the contractual mode in this subsample suggests that equity control is not 
necessary for the industry leaders with sufficient market power when serving as a teacher. The 
other four determinants also manifest their special effect in favor of the contractual mode for 
only one learning subsample: both alliance knowledge symmetry and firm knowledge asymmetry 
for leader-teaching alliances, firm experience symmetry for co-exploiting, and partner new 
experience for co-exploring.    
To further illustrate the learning dynamics between alliance partners, we classified the 
learning orientation of each leader in two periods of 20th versus 21st century, based on its highest 
share among leader-learning, leader-teaching, co-exploiting, and exploring. Although the 
dominating learning orientation of this sample is leader-teaching in both periods, we further 
classified 25 leaders into two evolutionary types of static and dynamic to indicate whether the 
leader changed its learning orientation over time. Among three Semiconductor sub-industries, all 
of three fabless and two foundry leaders demonstrated a dynamic evolutionary path, mainly from 
the mainstream leader-teaching to co-exploring. Such learning dynamics further supported our 
research findings about the stronger governance effects of resource complementarity. Because 
fabless firms outsource IC manufacturing to foundry firms, to enhance resource complementarity 
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is critical for both business and alliance partners. By contrast, although 12 IDM (Integrated 
Device Manufacturer) leaders maintain their static path, only Intel maintains its evolutionary 
path of co-exploring, whose share almost doubled from 33% to 62% in 21st century. The fact that 
Intel has outperformed all of the Semiconductor players, further attests to the proposition that 
co-exploration with alliance partners improves competitive advantage.     
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To illustrate contrasting governance effects, our hypothesized mode specifies a pair of 
symmetry and asymmetry determinants in the same dimension. Comparing three analysis levels 
of alliance-specific, firm-dyadic, and alliance-partner-triadic, the alliance-specific level, 
specified as control variables in our model, demonstrates the strongest governance effects as the 
prescription of TCE. The test results, that both dyadic and triadic levels as well as both measures 
by corporate-tree coding or not show equivalently direct effects, support our recommendation for 
more alliance studies incorporating multilevel factors and transactor-specific corporate structure, 
beyond the scope of a focal alliance. 
In conclusion, we found empirical support of both hypotheses for the direct or contingent 
governance effects of all governance determinants. By comparison, our findings demonstrate that 
resource complementarity is the stronger governance driver than resource similarity, as well as 
the governance effects of power and knowledge dimensions stronger than culture and experience 
dimensions. To further investigate the learning dynamics between partners, we further analyzed 
and tested the four subsamples of leader-learning, leader-teaching, co-exploiting, and 
co-exploring. Our findings, that none of determinants sustains its governance effect in all 
subsamples, imply that portfolio-specific learning orientations between alliance partners affect 
the choice of governance mode of industry leaders. 
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FIGURE 1 
Hypothesized Governance Model on the Equity-based Mode 
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